We find that perceptions of crime and individual experience with crime (crime victimization) are positively correlated with left-wing beliefs within countries, controlling for income and other correlates of ideology, in a sample for Latin American countries in the mid-1990's.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economists have increasingly argued that capitalist forms of organization outperform socialism. In practice, however, capitalist ideas appear to be doing very badly with the general public in certain regions of the world. Socialist ideas are more prevalent in the names and platforms of parties in low income countries (see Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2002) . Resistance to free markets has been observed in former communist countries in Eastern Europe, underdeveloped countries in Africa and even modern democracies in Europe. In Latin America this phenomenon is especially acute. After a decade of privatizations and de-regulation, a political backlash against markets has been observed in almost all of the countries in the region. Stokes (2001) and Lora and Olivera (2005) document the electoral costs of adopting pro-market reforms in Latin America. The question is why this has happened.
A natural explanation to most economists is that market forces make the income distribution less equal, leading the median voter to demand higher income taxes (as in a standard Meltzer and Richard model, 1981) . A problem with this explanation is that it fails to explain even the most basic patterns across countries. The pre-tax distribution of income in the US, for example, is more unequal than that in Europe. Yet, Americans want to, and actually do, redistribute less than the Europeans. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) present the data for OECD countries and stress the role of beliefs. They report that 60% of Americans, yet only 26% of Europeans, believe the poor are lazy, and also show that such beliefs are strong predictors of government intervention across countries.
1 However we still have little idea of what causes differences in beliefs. A natural hypothesis is that they simply reflect the different experiences that individuals have. Piketty (1995) is a seminal paper with these features where two identical economies evolve along different paths due to differences in initial shocks. Other papers explore the role of fairness (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005) , corruption (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2002) and also the incentives for people to engage in belief manipulation (Benabou and Tirole, 2006) .
Evidence on the structure of beliefs includes Hochschild (1981) , Inglehart (1990) , Ladd and Bowman (1998) , Corneo and Gruner (2002 ), Fong (2001 , 2004 and Di Tella, Schargrodsky and Galiani, (2007) , inter alia.
In this paper we study the connection between crime and beliefs. A natural place to start is political ideology: social conservatives are preoccupied with maintaining law and order, typically supporting being "tough on crime". In the economic domain, however, the connection may go in a different direction. Consider a property crime after which the victim (criminal) has less (more) money. The distribution of income is less fair, unless one believes that the criminal is more deserving than the victim. Theoretically at least, an increase in crime could move beliefs in a left-wing direction. Of course, higher crime is going to raise the demand for punishment and may give salience to social conservatives. But from the point of view of economic beliefs, it is hard to avoid the perception that the distribution of income in society is less fair. Likewise, when crime is high it is harder to believe that poverty is caused by laziness rather than bad luck, as the latter may include crime victimization. If true, this raises the intriguing possibility that reform fatigue in Latin America is caused by the observed increase in crime during the 1990's. We study economic beliefs and observe their correlation with individual perceptions and experience of crime in this region and during this period. Section II describes the data and empirical strategy. Results are reported in section III and section IV concludes.
II. DATA and EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Our main data source is the Latinobarometer, an annual public opinion survey of approximately answer some questions about the problem of poverty, in this country and in other countries: How fair do you think the distribution of income is in this country?" is "Very unfair" and equal to 0 if the answer is "Very fair", "Fair", "Neither fair nor unfair" or "Unfair". We repeated the analysis using each of the five categories and the results remain similar. The appendix has a complete data description.
We also have data on the respondent's perception of the changes in the crime level (Perception of Crime)
and victimization experience (Real Crime). With respect to Perception of Crime, the raw data show that 96,358 individuals selected the answer "crime has increased a lot over the past year", a total of 14,610 say "it has increased somewhat", 8,591 say "it has stayed the same", 2,904 say "it has dropped somewhat" while 439 say
"it has dropped a lot". Thus, we collapsed the answers into two, with the first category being "increased a lot" and the second being all the remaining categories. We again repeated the analysis using each of the five categories and the results remain similar. Table A Column (2) presents the same specification but using Privatize-L as the dependent variable. The proportion of the population who perceived privatizations to have not 'been beneficial' to their country rose from 48.6% in 1995 to 75.3% in 2004. Those individuals who perceive crime to have increased also tend to disagree that privatization of public companies has been beneficial. In other words, those who perceive crime to have risen also state the more left-wing position. As in the previous regression the effect is significant at the 1% level, although its size is smaller. In column (3) the dependent variable is State-L and its coefficient is insignificant.
III. RESULTS

Column (1) in
Columns (4-6) present a similar set of regressions, but we increase the basic set of controls (Personal Controls II). Besides Personal Controls I, these regressions add Income II, city size, education, occupation and ideology. Similar results obtain. This is a partial answer to the objection that the results may be picking up the fact that left-wing people are of a particular type who happen also to perceive bigger increases in crime. For example, it could be that left-wingers happen to be poor and the poor live in areas that experience higher crime increases.
A second way to provide a sense of the robustness of the results is to use victimization data. The survey asks whether the respondent or a member of his or her immediate family was a victim of crime in the last year. The proportion of victimized respondents rose from 29.8% in 1995 to 35.1% in 2004.
In Table B both Fair-L and Privatize-L again show a significant positive association with being a victim of crime, even when all the co-variates are included (Personal Controls II). When State-L is used as the dependent variable, the correlation is weakly positive.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We investigate the relationship between crime and economic ideology. Given the large increase in crime in Latin America during the 1990's, our conjecture is that this force may be behind the observed backlash against pro-market reforms in the region. Using recent data from the Latinobarómetro Surveys, we find that people who believe that crime has increased also report a lower intensity of promarket beliefs. For example, they tend to believe that the distribution of income is unfair, or they disagree with the idea that privatizations have been good for the country. The correlation survives the inclusion of two different sets of controls for individual income (one self-reported and the other constructed by the interviewer), controls for age, gender, marital status, education, occupation, ideology, (country-specific) city size dummies and country and year fixed effects. We also find that beliefs are correlated with a person's victimization experience in the expected direction (i.e., victims report more anti-market beliefs). 
